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SCHWARZER, District Judge: 
 
         Beverly Enterprises-Pennsylvania, Inc., brought this action under 
Section 301 of 
the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.  185(a) and (c)(2), for a 
declaration that the 
union security clause in its collective bargaining agreement violates 
Section 8(a)(3) of the 
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), 29 U.S.C.  158(a)(3).  The 
defendant unions 
are District 1199C of the National Union of Hospital and Health Care 
Employees and the 
National Union itself.  The defendants are labor organizations and Beverly 
is an employer within 
the meaning of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.  152(2), (5).  Beverly's complaint 
alleges that the clause is 
void and unenforceable under Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 
(1988).  
Assuming subject matter jurisdiction, the district court dismissed for 
lack of standing by Beverly.  
We will affirm, but on a different ground. 
         Beck was an action brought by a group of employees against their 
union. The 
plaintiff employees alleged that the union had violated Section 8(a)(3), 
the duty of fair 
representation, and their First Amendment rights, by using dues paid by 
them under the 
compulsion of a union-security clause in the collective bargaining 
agreement for noncollective 
bargaining activities.  The Supreme Court held that the Section 8(a)(3) 
claim "falls squarely 
within the primary jurisdiction of the [NLRA]," but that the "court was 
not precluded . . . from 
deciding the merits of this claim insofar as such a decision was necessary 
to the disposition of 
respondents' duty-of-fair-representation challenge."  Beck, 487 U.S. at 
742-43.  The Court noted 
that the employees were not trying to circumvent the primary jurisdiction 
of the Board, but were 
claiming that the union failed to represent their interest fairly by 
negotiating and enforcing an 
agreement not in their interests and explained:  "The necessity of 
deciding the scope of 8(a)(3) 
arises because [the unions] seek to defend themselves on the ground that 
the statute authorizes 
precisely this type of agreement."  Id. 
         To put it most charitably, Beverly's claim turns Beck on its 
head.  It does not 
invoke Section 8(a)(3) as a defense for its actions.  Rather, it attempts 
to use it to attack the 
collective bargaining agreement which it negotiated with the unions.  
Putting aside the anomaly 
of an employer attacking the agreement it itself had negotiated, we hold 
the claim that the unions 
have violated Section 8(a)(3) falls squarely within the primary 
jurisdiction of the Board.  
         This Court's decision in Mack Trucks, Inc. v. International 
Union, UAW, 856 
F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1988), makes clear that the district court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over 
this dispute.  In that case, Mack brought a Section 301 action to enforce 
a collective bargaining 
agreement.  Id. at 583.  The Union disputed the existence of the agreement 
and, asserting that the 
issue fell under the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, 
challenged the court's 
jurisdiction to decide the dispute.  Id. at 583-84.  This Court held that 
Section 301 conferred 
jurisdiction on the district court to decide this particular contract 
issue -- whether the contract 
existed -- even if the Union's claim also constituted an unfair labor 
practice under the NLRA.  Id.at 590.  In reaching its decision, this Court 
distinguished cases holding that federal courts lacked 
Section 301 jurisdiction over challenges to contracts on the basis that 
they conflicted with the 
NLRA or some other external agreement.  Id. at 589. 
         Mack does not confer jurisdiction here.  Beverly's claim is not 
that no contract 
exists -- the basis of Section 301 jurisdiction in Mack.  Rather, Beverly 
claims that the contract is 
in part void and unenforceable because it violates the NLRA.  This is 
exactly the type of situation 
that Mack makes clear does not fall under the Section 301 jurisdiction of 
the federal courts.  Id.at 584. 
         Consequently, since the federal court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over this 
dispute, the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint was 
correct and we will 
affirm it. 
